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‘Emptying the cage, changing the birds’: State rescaling, path-dependency 





The Pearl River Delta (hereafter PRD) extended metropolitan region in the southeastern 
corner of China has functioned as the national economic ‘motor’ since experimentation 
with global economic (re)integration began in 1978. By official definition, the PRD 
comprises nine cities, namely Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, 
Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, and Zhaoqing. Encompassing less than 1% of China’s 
total land area and registering less than 4% of the total national population, the nine 
mainland cities account for almost 10% of China’s GDP1 over the last decade; during the 
same period, the region embedded an estimated 20% of its foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and generated approximately 25% of national trade. The location of three of China’s first 
four Special Economic Zones (SEZs), namely Shantou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai, the PRD is 
part of a broader Guangdong province that absorbed the largest number of domestic 
migrant workers since cross-country mobility was relaxed in the 1980s (Chinese 
Population Census, 2010). Viewed as an integrated whole, this city-region has become 
deeply articulated in the global economy.  
The global financial crisis of 2008 made it clear, however, that global economic 
integration through Guangdong was a double-edged sword. As economic slowdown 
became apparent in early 2008, the biggest challenge for the-then newly-appointed Party 
Secretary of Guangdong, Wang Yang, was to ensure decreasing global demand did not 
transpose into negative economic growth. The Guangdong provincial government 
subsequently responded with a strategy of state-driven value chain upgrading known as 
“double relocation” (shuang zhuanyi). Launched in tandem with policies to ‘scale up’ the 
national significance of three territories in the PRD (Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha; ref 
Figure 1)2, “double location” involved shifting labor categorized as ‘low-skilled’ and firms 
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categorized as “high in pollution, high in energy use and low in efficiency” (lianggao yidi) 
from the PRD to the underdeveloped regions of the province3.  
Figure 1 here 
Problems emerged when this policy appeared to undermine the structural stability 
of the national political economy. It foregrounds, in turn, two contradictory aspects of the 
relationship between the Guangdong provincial government and the top echelon of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC). At one level, the ‘double relocation’ policy reflects a 
specific post-Mao “political logic” of reforms known as “reciprocal accountability” (Shirk, 
1993). This logic invites developmental initiatives of national significance from local 
governments, in the anticipation that these governments would reciprocate by aligning their 
initiatives to national objectives (cf. Rawski, 1995; Sheng, 2010). At another level, 
however, it challenged the longstanding policymaking philosophy officially termed ‘the 
entire country as a chessboard’ (quanguo yipanqi). This emphasis on holistic national 
governance was first espoused by Ke Qingshi, the former Mayor of Shanghai and CPC 
Politburo member, in 1959 (Ke, 1959; cf. editorial in People’s Daily, 24 February 1959). 
While the socioeconomic context of the 1950s differed significantly from that of 
contemporary China, national-scale regulation in the form of ‘macro adjustments’ 
(hongguan tiaokong) continues to underpin central policymaking (cf. Webber et al, 2002; 
Zhao, 2009). Opposition to the ‘double relocation’ policy emerged against this backdrop: 
some senior cadres did not perceive the economic restructuring of Guangdong during and 
after the 2008 crisis to be a strategic ‘move’ vis-à-vis the national ‘chessboard’. 
Drawing from empirical research4  conducted on industrial upgrading and policy 
experimentation in the PRD, this paper conceptualizes the ‘double relocation’ industrial 
policy in Guangdong as an expression of the tension between state rescaling and 
institutional path-dependency. State rescaling refers to the reconfiguration of regulatory 
relations between the national, subnational and supranational governments, such that what 
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represents the ‘national interest’ is no longer expressed and realized at one scale (i.e. 
initiated by the central government across the entire state spatiality). Following Peck 
(2002), Brenner (2004) and Jessop and Sum (2006), this reconfiguration is viewed 
simultaneously as a medium and an outcome of political strategies launched at different 
regulatory scales – i.e. the subnational, national and global – vis-à-vis the imperatives of 
capital accumulation. While rescaling has been accommodated within the Chinese party-
state apparatus to facilitate more flexible responses to global economic changes, the paper 
shows how it potentially destabilizes the coherence of a national politico-economic 
structure that was (and remains) export-oriented. This is because the process intrinsically 
contains what Wedeman (2001) terms “strategic disobedience” by actors positioned at 
lower levels of the administrative hierarchy.  
Strategic disobedience becomes possible – if not implicitly encouraged – because 
guidelines to determine either willful non-conformity or political incompetence are relatively 
flexible within the party-state structure. Perhaps the most “strategic” aspect of this 
“disobedience” is the paradoxical attempt by the Guangdong government to justify state-
driven industrial upgrading in the name of enhancing national economic development when 
it 1) goes precisely against the ‘national chessboard’ pathway instituted since the late 
1950s and simultaneously 2) undermines the newer industrialization pathway along the 
eastern seaboard instituted during the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). In this regard, the 
Wang administration’s attempt to territorially reconfigure Guangdong’s industrial 
composition – and, by extension, regulatory relations between the central, provincial and 
city governments – more accurately reflects tensions with national-level spatial strategies 
launched by earlier regimes. This highlights, in turn, the necessity for a robust historical 
engagement in conceptualizing Chinese state rescaling. 
The paper is organized in four parts. Section 2 situates the emergence of the 
Chinese political economy as an ‘interscalar rule regime’ within the framework of state 
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rescaling, strategic disobedience and institutional path-dependency. This integrated 
framework fleshes out two constitutive aspects of state rescaling that remain under-
focused in research on Chinese state rescaling – political agency and historical 
contingency. Section 3 will explain how a rolling series of national-level spatial strategies 
came in tension with the ‘double relocation’ industrial policy. Building on this geographical-
historical basis, section 4 shows how simultaneous industrial relocation and value chain 
upgrading was portrayed as an impossible task vis-à-vis the prevailing export-driven and 
coastal-based approach to capital accumulation. It was for this reason that economic 
restructuring in Guangdong became politicized at the national scale. The concluding 
section emphasizes how state rescaling in Guangdong was contingent on industrial 
reconfigurations that were never ascertained a priori by the Chinese central government. 
Conceptually, this phenomenon raises the question whether state rescaling is an ad hoc 
process for local governments in China to perpetuate the narrowly-defined developmental 
approach known as ‘GDP-ism’, or, perhaps counter-intuitively, whether it has become a 
function of central governance across the Chinese political economy. 
 
 
2. State rescaling, path-dependency and economic restructuring in post-Mao China 
 
The concept of state rescaling was originally developed to understand the transformation 
of Fordist-Keynesianism, namely the structurally-coherent model of ‘mass production, 
mass consumption’ that underpinned national-scale development in western Europe after 
WWII. As this coherence destabilized from the mid-1970s, proactive spatial strategies are 
observed to have led to the re-articulation of (nationally-oriented) political economies within 
the global system of capitalism (Peck, 2002, 2003; Brenner, 2004, 2009; Jones and 
Jessop, 2010). This shift was primarily characterized by the growing concentration of 
developmental resources in city-regions in western Europe. Correspondingly, there was a 
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rollback in the relatively egalitarian distribution of economic opportunities across the 
national territories.  
State rescaling was and remains reactive to the crisis tendencies of capitalism in 
the first instance. Scalar reconfiguration was necessary because earlier strategies that 
emphasized national-scale regulation in the Fordist heartlands simultaneously generated 
constraints on the ability of firms to sustain growing rates of profits (Lipietz, 1982; 1997). 
The ensuing crisis of Fordism led Brenner (2004) to hypothesize in New State Spaces 
(2004), a major book-length reference point to state rescaling, that “urbanization processes 
would engender contextually specific forms of sociospatial dislocation and crisis formation, 
as well as corresponding strategies of political intervention designed to confront the latter.” 
(Brenner, 2009: 127). What the rescaling process characterizes, then, is a rolling 
transformation with no end-state (cf. Peck, 2003); it is, more precisely, an intensifying and 
recursive response to the socioeconomic instability intrinsic to capital accumulation. 
Driving this process are new interventionist policies in targeted territories. As Brenner 
(2009b: 128) explains, 
since the 1990s, new forms of state rescaling have emerged largely in response to the crisis 
tendencies engendered through the first wave of urban locational policy. This has led to the 
construction of new scales of state intervention (neighbourhoods, metropolitan regions and 
transnational interurban networks), to the crystallization of additional crisis tendencies and 
dislocations and, subsequently, to a further intensification and acceleration of rescaling 
processes. Processes of state rescaling therefore appear to be animated through regulatory 
failure. 
 
Primary aspects of “regulatory failure” in western Europe were encapsulated within the 
dismantlement of what Jessop (1993) terms ‘Keynesian welfare state”. These aspects 
were the weakening welfarist state system; the ‘internationalization’ of previously-Fordist 
corporations; and the “hollowing out” of the state (cf. Rhodes, 1997; Peck, 2001). For 
Jessop and Sum (2006: 271, 281), the decline of the national scale as the “taken-for-
granted object of economic management” across Atlantic Fordism, the East Asian ‘trading 
nations’ and important-substituting Latin America marked the emergence of a 
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“relativisation of scale” in socioeconomic regulation, namely “the absence of a dominant 
nodal point in managing interscalar relations”.  
A major expression of this “relativisation” is the emergence of inter-scalar rule 
regimes. These regimes are produced when central state institutions, “reconceived and 
restructured” under pressures from/of (neoliberalizing) globalization, increasingly engage 
“in more active processes of scale management and coordination at the local and 
international levels” (Peck, 2002: 340). The devolution and outsourcing of central control in 
this new state form is expressed in the growing importance of subnational ‘rule regimes’ – 
with new politics and socioeconomic policies that involve and impact actors positioned in 
different scales – in relation to national and supranational regulatory bodies (Peck, 2002; 
Harrison, 2012; Jonas, 2013). Inter-scalar rule regimes presuppose the function of national 
political economies as dynamic platforms that shape and are shaped by intrinsically 
speculative policy experimentation in targeted locations. Their emergence foregrounds 
tensions between attempts to re-define the preexisting regulatory structure of state space 
through new policy initiatives and attempts to retain and/or repurpose this structure. An 
important empirical question for research on inter-scalar rule regimes is whether these 
tensions could be resolved and/or deferred in order to facilitate sustained capital 
accumulation. 
Certain distinctions must be made when ascertaining the relevance of this question 
in the socioeconomic context of post-Mao China. The spatial logics of socioeconomic 
regulation during the Mao Zedong era (1949-1976) was never predicated on a Fordist 
mode of production and its corresponding state form, the Keynesian welfare state. Rather, 
the Mao administration sought to negate urbanizing impulses through systematic controls 
of demographic and resource flows. The scalar regulatory template was characterized by 
three interrelated arrangements. First, approximately 80% of the population was 
segregated from cities through the urban-rural ‘dual structure’ (chengxiang eryuan jiegou). 
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Second, residents within the rural hinterland were divided into production units known as 
the ‘People’s Communes’. Third, centrally-directed industrial production was based 
predominantly in cities, while raw materials were supplied through administratively-
decentralized rural communes. Integration with the global economy was minimal. The 
primary “regulatory failure” during this period was the inability of economically nationalistic 
policies to raise living standards and reduce poverty for the majority of the population. With 
Mao’s passing in 1976, the CPC urgently needed to overcome this problem. A major 
recourse was to re-integrate city-regions with the global system of capitalism, and as 
section 3 will elaborate, this would first take place in Guangdong.  
Research has demonstrated how the gradual but ultimately expansionary exposure 
of Chinese state space to transnational processes of production and consumption has 
triggered the urbanization of capital and labor power (Ma, 2005; Shen, 2007; He and Wu, 
2009). This shift was neither a sudden effect of market-oriented reforms nor firm-induced 
relocations due to falling profit rates. As Ma (2005: 483) puts it, CPC cadres had been 
keen to expand development even during the Mao era: “Despite Mao’s personal anti-
urbanism during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the urban scale has always been 
the preferred scale on the part of officials.” This preference was shaped, in turn, by 
industrial developments in pre-1949 ‘old society’. At the time, industrial capital goods were 
heavily concentrated along coastal cities as well as the Japanese-controlled northeast 
(then known as Manchukuo). After the Deng Xiaoping government launched SEZs in 1980 
and expanded these zones to other cities in 1984, an increasingly urbanizing inter-scalar 
rule regime emerged (Cartier, 2005; Huang, 2008; He and Wu, 2009; Wu, 2015). Ma 
(2005: 495) reflects on the implications of this new development: 
From the perspective of scale relations, China’s focus on the national scale of development 
during the socialist era has been replaced by a downward shift in the scale of operation 
focused on the cities. With such a shift, the earlier preeminent and monopolistic state mode 
of articulation has been rescaled downward to the urban scale. This development raises the 
question as to what roles should subnational scales, i.e., provincial, regional, county and 
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township, play in national development and what should their scalar relations be. (Ma, 2005: 
495) 
 
The primary question to be asked of this new rule regime is the relationship between 
urban-based industrial development and the enhancement of the ‘national interest’. It 
remains unclear, specifically, how the urban scale could constitute the “national strategy” 
of development within the context of a Leninist party-state apparatus. Perhaps more 
crucially, the relationship between Mao-era institutional legacies and the growing 
urbanization of capital (including labor power) remains an open empirical question. To 
address this, the paper will consider the role of institutional path-dependency in the 
process of state rescaling. 
Arguably the most common definition of path dependence is the constitutive – if not 
also constraining – influence of previous actions or decisions on current and future 
actions/decisions. As Page (2006: 89) puts it, path dependence “requires a build-up of 
behavioral routines, social connections, or cognitive structures around an institution.” 
Central to this process is the eventual formation of institutional “lock in”, in which a practice 
or policy becomes effective or feasible because a large number of people have adopted or 
become used to this practice or policy. Even if the available alternatives were inherently 
superior to the existing institutional practices, any drastic alterations to the path would 
naturally encounter resistance5 from groups of ‘locked in’ actors because the proposed 
changes would compromise their interests. It is important to note, however, that the “build 
up” to specific pathways is often overlooked (Page, 2006). Path formation is commonly 
construed as an accidental outcome, but this is not necessarily the case. In a thorough 
review, Peters et al (2005) identify a tendency in research on institutional path-dependence 
to accord history a logical trajectory, or “retrospective rationality”, such that available 
alternatives and political conflicts that occurred in tandem with the actual occurrences of 
historical processes are neglected. As such, argue Peter et al (2005: 1282), “prediction of 
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persistence does not help at all in understanding institutional change.”  
The notion of a “logical trajectory” is further complicated because developmental 
pathways are geographically variegated. As Martin and Sunley (2006) and Martin (2010) 
have shown, the developmental paths of subnational regions are neither unique nor 
delimited to those regions. These interventions foreground two interrelated blind spots in 
the historical institutionalist literature on path-dependency: the socio-spatial context in and 
through which a specific ‘path’ was set is often unclear, as is the connection between 
changes at the subnational or supranational scales and the structural coherence of the 
national political economy. Through an emphasis on state rescaling as a politicized 
process, this paper will demonstrate institutional path-dependency as an open-ended, 
inter-scalar process. Attempts at breaking out of subnational paths through regulatory 
reconfigurations need not generate new paths at the national scale; on the contrary, they 
could potentially reinforce the “persistence” and “locked in” status quo of these paths.  
The emphasis on political agency in this paper is deliberate. Across China, 
subnational development is driven by a diverse and often overlapping array of interest 
groups (cf. Horowitz and Marsh, 2002; Breslin, 2007; Sheng, 2007). They range from local 
governments (e.g. provincial, county and/or urban governments) seeking to bolster GDP 
growth rates (Yu, 2014a; Wu, 2015); village collectives seeking rent from leasing land for 
non-agricultural activities (Zheng et al, 2009; Wang et al, 2009); state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) seeking to enhance their positions at the national scale through local market 
capture (Bai et al, 2004; Yu, 2014b); third-party associations lobbying for better operating 
conditions for their members (Pearson, 1994; Chen, 2003; Deng and Kennedy, 2010); and, 
last but not least, TNCs seeking locations that offer the best opportunities for ‘strategic 
coupling’ (Demurger et al, 2002; Wei and Liao, 2013).  
The primary goal of these interest groups is to secure fresh opportunities for capital 
accumulation; the challenge for the central government is to align this goal to the eventual 
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formation of a ‘socialist market economy’. To do so successfully in the context of growing 
economic openness entails seeking out new regulatory spaces within which preferential 
policies can be implemented without destabilizing the legacies of inherited institutions (cf. 
Solinger, 2005). This delicate balancing act reflects an undercurrent of state rescaling 
possibly unique to China: it is made possible by 1) the central government’s experimental 
and gradualist approach to instituting new policies (Naughton, 1995; Göbel, 2011; 
Heilmann and Perry, 2011) and 2) the national system of reciprocal accountability that 
entails both central and local decisions to complement those of other levels (Shirk, 1993; 
Naughton, 2008; Xu, 2011). 
The willingness of senior CPC policymakers to listen to local-level proposals 
reinforces the importance of “reciprocal accountability” in two aspects. One, the growing 
exposure of Chinese state spatiality to transnational capital flows calls for flexible and 
geographically-specific responses to opportunities that could not be predetermined at/for 
the national scale. Two, because of the need for the central government to be flexible in 
generating place-specific responses to opportunities or problems generated by 
transnational economic integration, there is no one-size-fits-all national developmental 
agenda. In response to these open-ended aspects, local governments have been lobbying 
national agencies such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) to implement experimental policies in their jurisdictions that contribute to the 
‘national strategy’ (guojia zhanlüe). The rationale of state rescaling is therefore as likely to 
be motivated by the political agendas of these local governments as they are aligned to 
national objectives.  
To follow Wedeman (2001, 2003), local governments’ enthusiasm for reforms and 
policy experimentation could transpose into a form of “disobedience”. In China’s long and 
entrenched hierarchical chain of command, Wedeman (2001: 71) argues, “structurally 
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induced ambiguities create opportunities [for cadres] to engage in willful disobedience 
because they imply that willful disobedience will go unpunished”. And in the context of 
Guangdong politico-economic development, this “disobedience” is exemplified by a well-
known ‘traffic light theory’ (denglun): “when the red light flashes, detours are made; when 
the yellow light flashes, there is a mad dash; when the green light flashes, everyone 
clamors to move”. As the discussion will show, however, Wedeman’s (2001) postulation 
has two limiting assumptions. First, he assumed a directive from the Chinese central 
government – the metaphorical traffic light – had to be issued prior to any “disobedience”. 
Second, Wedeman took the central government as a unitary unit. Disobedience was 
therefore a function of and a response to directives from an ostensibly united central 
government.  
These assumptions have to be re-evaluated, however, in light of the intrinsic 
dynamism of state rescaling. As previously mentioned, the reconfiguration of regulatory 
relations need not be driven or mandated by national-level institutions in the first instance. 
Any apparent “disobedience” in the form of reform-minded initiatives is therefore not a 
direct form of “non-compliance” to a central governmental directive. The policymaking 
regime in Beijing was never a unitary entity to begin with; any consensus forged would only 
be temporary and are subject to regular challenges (Lü, 2000; McGregor, 2012; Ferchen, 
2013). While various forms of decentralized governance characterized the politico-
economic evolution of post-1949 ‘new China’, the regulatory rationale in the Mao-era was 
to keep each province (and the respective administrative scales within each province) 
separate and directly under the control of the central government (Donnithorne, 1972; 
Harding, 1981). Even though this regulatory logic still underpins inter-provincial relations in 
the post-Mao ‘transition’ to market-like rule, the provincial and municipal governments have 
been granted greater agency in putting forth developmental agendas in the name of the 
‘national interest’. What this translates in practical terms is an enhanced – albeit temporary 
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– positioning in relation to the global competition for capital. This is the primary reason 
provincial and municipal officials covet the power to ‘move first, experiment first’ (xianxing 
xianshi quan). 
Crucially, this competitive dynamic increases at once the power of the provincial 
and central governments. Within each provincial-level government, each administrative 
leader has to convince the Party Secretary and Governor of his/her jurisdiction’s ability to 
be the next “nationally strategic” reform frontier; this adds further dynamism to the relations 
between the provincial and the county/municipal governments. The same logic applies to 
central-provincial relations. Decentralized governance has taken on the effect of enhancing 
the legitimacy and power of the central government against a globally interconnected 
context, an aspect inadequately conceptualized through the centralization-decentralization 
dichotomy that underpins prevailing research on local resistance. Changing regulatory 
relations between different levels of governments in China may contain ‘disobedience’; 
indeed, bottom-up initiatives may appear to be bypassing the ‘red light’ from Beijing, but, 
as the next two sections will show, neither the process nor the outcome can be understood 




3. Moving out of an established pathway? The emergence of “double relocation” in 
post-crisis Guangdong 
 
State rescaling in and through Guangdong during and after the 2008 global financial crisis 
was inextricably entwined with the evolution and impacts of territorially-targeted reforms 
implemented earlier at the provincial and national levels. For the large part of the past 
three decades, Guangdong maintained its leading position in the Chinese economic-
geographical hierarchy because of preferential policies instituted during the Deng Xiaoping 
era (~1978 to 1992). This position reflects the systemic coastal bias that saw provincial 
and city governments along the more industrialized eastern seaboard enjoy preferential 
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treatment from central government agencies vis-à-vis their counterparts in the less-
developed western and northeastern interior. Underpinning Deng Xiaoping’s macro-scale 
approach to spatial reconfiguration was the ‘ladder-step transition theory’, or tidu tuiyi lilun, 
first espoused by the Shanghai-based academics Xia Yulong and Feng Zhijun (1982). This 
prescriptive ‘theory’ attracted the attention of a senior CPC cadre, Bo Yibo, and 
subsequently permeated central policymaking circles. It was instituted as a policy blueprint 
during the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). Specifically, the blueprint delineated the 
Chinese political economy into three economic-geographical belts: the eastern (coastal), 
central, and western. The Deng administration gave one belt (the eastern seaboard) the 
priority in ascending the development ‘ladder’. It assumed that the fruits of development in 
the ‘first mover’ belt would diffuse downwards to other rungs of the ladder. The ‘ladder 
step’ theory opened up a new geographical template for reforms and simultaneously 
placated party conservatives through retaining the ‘chessboard’ approach to national 
governance (cf. Wang and Hu, 1999; Zhu, 2003; Lin, 2004).  
Because of Deng’s economic-geographical reconfiguration, Guangdong ranked as 
China’s top province by GDP annually since 1989. Statistics for 2007 – the year before the 
global financial crisis – indicate that 96% of import/export trade in Guangdong was 
concentrated in the PRD. This suggests economic data for Guangdong province would be 
an effective measure of the economic performance of the PRD (Guangdong Statistical 
Bureau, 2008). Placed in relation to national-level import/export figures, Guangdong on 
average accounts for almost 30% of the national total since China’s accession to the WTO 
in 2001 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Along with the growing inflows of capital, 
Guangdong province experienced the highest growth in inter-provincial movement of 
migrant workers – also known widely as the ‘floating population’ (liudong renkou) – within 
China between 2000 and 2010 (see full report by Liang et al, 2014). According to the 
Chinese national population census of 2010, a third of this ‘floating population’ of around 
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200 million was concentrated in Guangdong. A separate national report published in 2014 
indicates that Guangdong remained the leading destination: it absorbed 29.4% of the 
floating population, which has since increased to 245 million by the end of 2013 (21st 
Century Business Herald, 11 April 2015). These statistics on trade and employment 
collectively demonstrate the PRD to be by far the most deeply ‘articulated’ Chinese city-
region within the global system of capitalism.  
This articulation was and remains enabled by the geographical proximity to the 
post-colonial cities of Hong Kong and Macau. Currently the Special Administrative Regions 
(SARs) of China, these cities have functioned as offshore capital markets and operating 
platforms for firms looking to invest in China. What ensued was a cross-border, ‘front shop, 
back factory’ spatial division of labor that Lin (1997) terms “red capitalism in south China” 
(ref. Figure 1). Reflecting the effect of the national-scale ‘retain the big and letting go of the 
small’ (zuoda fangxiao) industrial policies, medium and small enterprises have taken the 
role of manufacturing subcontractors, while the major financiers and lead investors 
comprise state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and TNCs. The emergence of this multi-
dimensional relationship with foreign capital in and through Guangdong offers an important 
prism through which to evaluate post-1978 politico-economic reforms in China. Foreign 
capital investments allowed GDP to grow without the concomitant emergence of a large 
private capitalist class that is capable of undercutting CPC interests (cf. Dickson, 2008). 
What ‘red capitalism’ in Guangdong exemplifies, then, is the ability of the CPC to subsume 
the enlargement of the non-state economic sector to party goals. Zhang (2013: 1614) puts 
this state-capital relationship in clear perspective: “the political power of capital in China 
remains fundamentally embedded in, and interlaced with, the sprawling institutional 
machinery of the Leninist party-state and the political capacities of the CCP”.  
The deep(ening) articulation of Guangdong-based enterprises and labor power in 
global production networks built on and reinforced this relationship. Specifically, it 
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generated two developmental pathways that were (and remain) entwined at different 
scales. At the national level, it was integral to and consolidated Deng Xiaoping’s previously 
mentioned ‘ladder step’ approach. According to data from the Guangdong Bureau of 
Statistics (2008), the foreign trade to GDP proportion (also known as the trade dependency 
ratio6) for Guangdong province as a whole averaged 150% per year from 2001 to 2007; the 
figure for Dongguan, a major manufacturing hub within the PRD, was consistently above 
250% in the same period. By comparison, the national average was (an already-high) 66.2% 
in 2007 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2008). At the regional level, it generated 
technological ‘lock in’ that thrived on and fed off the national focus on labor-intensive and 
export-oriented production. Research has demonstrated foreign investments into the Pearl 
River Delta, particularly those via Hong Kong, did not generate the spillovers that enable 
industrial upgrading through the 2000s (Huang and Sharif, 2009; Meyer et al, 2012). What 
ensued, instead, was intra-provincial polarization and a recognition that externally-driven 
growth was unsustainable (Lu and Wei, 2007; Wei and Liao, 2012). Chen (2007: 193) 
sums up the constraining effect of this ‘lock in’:  
Most PRD-based firms and factories may be trapped in the assembling and manufacturing 
segment of the production chain and earning merely labor-processing fees rather than 
engaged in acquiring technology, developing their own brand-name products, and creating 
international markets directly. 
 
The regulatory challenge associated with the strong exposure to international trade 
became pronounced after the 2008 global financial crisis precipitated a sharp decline in 
effective demand for manufactured goods from Guangdong-based industries. 
Consequently, the province’s total volume of imports and exports decreased for 8 
consecutive months from November 2008, with the largest monthly decline rate reaching 
31.1%. Foreign capital investments dropped by over 50%. According to customs statistics, 
the total import/export value in Guangdong recorded 257.87 billion yuan (~US$40.1 billion) 
in the first half of 2009, a 20.7% decrease year-on-year (People’s Daily, 3 August 2009). 
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Through an investigation spanning three years, the Nanfang Dushibao (2 April 2012) 
reported that two waves of factory closures followed after the crisis struck. Between 2008 
and 2009, it was estimated that half of the 58,500 Hong Kong-owned export-processing 
subsidiaries would not survive, while a new wave of closures affecting more sectors took 
place in 2011. To address this challenge, the newly-installed Wang administration 
responded swiftly. And this placed the two putatively interrelated pathways on a collision 
course. 
In a candid evaluation published in “The Outline of the Reform and Development 
Plan for the Pearl River Delta (2008-2020)” 7 , the Guangdong provincial government 
delineated how earlier approaches to capital accumulation in the PRD have generated 
their own internal contradictions: 
 The overall industrial body is of the lower-order; value-added of product is not high, 
the trade structure is not reasonable; innovative capacities are insufficient; and the 
overall competitiveness is not strong. 
 The degree of land development is excessive; the ability to conserve energy and 
resources is relatively weak; the problems with environmental pollution are 
relatively pronounced; resource limitations have become apparent; hence the 
traditional model of development cannot be sustained.  
 Urban-rural and regional development remains uneven; the allocation of productive 
forces is still not reasonable; and the efficiency of spatial usage is not high. 
 Social projects are relatively lagging behind; the development of human resources, 
public service standards and ‘soft’ cultural capabilities are to be improved. 
 The administrative management systems, social management system and other 
areas continue to face heavy reform tasks; tackling difficulties of reform have 
become greater.  
 
The Guangdong government responded to these contradictions with a strong dose of 
‘shock therapy’ almost immediately after Wang’s appointment in December 2007. The 
restructuring roadmap was rolled out in March 2008 with four instructions to the local 
government of Dongguan, Guangdong’s major manufacturing hub located between 
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Shenzhen and Guangzhou (the provincial capital; ref. Figure 1). These instructions were, 
namely, to 1) push through the readjustment of the industrial structure and the 
‘transformation and upgrading’ (zhuanxing shengji)8 of commodities produced; 2) reduce 
the urban population and improve labor force quality; 3) engage in comprehensive 
planning and gain momentum in the restructuring process; and 4) remain resolute in 
response to challenges, with a view of dismantling rigid ways of thinking, rigid 
developmental approaches, and the rigid constellation of interest groups (Guangzhou 
Daily, 27 March 2008).  
Interestingly, these plans preceded the global financial crisis. This strongly 
suggests industrial reconfiguration in Guangdong was part of a path-changing agenda 
independent of the crisis. As previously mentioned in section 2, the reconfiguration 
initiative was local. Its objective was to reshape existing spatial divisions of labor at the 
provincial scale in order to ensure national economic stability. Read in relation to this 
objective, the primary goal of the ‘Outline’ was to enable Guangdong to break out of the 
centrally established trajectory of export-oriented production. Wang summed up his 
approach through a strong warning to the Dongguan cadres: “If Dongguan does not 
reconfigure its industrial structure today, it will be reconfigured by the industrial structure 
tomorrow” (Ibid.).  
By asserting Dongguan would be “reconfigured by the industrial structure 
tomorrow”, Wang demonstrated an awareness that places are vulnerable to capital’s 
inherent tendency to relocate to places that could offer higher rates of profits through 
cheaper labor costs and/or access to more cost-effective technologies (cf. Massey, 1984; 
Harvey, 2005). As a major global manufacturing site for TNCs, the PRD was particularly 
exposed to these pressures. To enable PRD-based firms to generate higher profit rates, 
Wang played up the importance of place-based agency to preempt the effects of relocation 
by reconfiguring the industrial structure. This agency is embodied by the ability of local 
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governments to influence, proactively and strategically, the course taken by capital. It 
entails the quick identification of growing economic inefficiencies in firms within their 
respective jurisdictions. To this end, Wang implored Dongguan’s cadres, the “government 
must fully develop its impact by devising and implementing policies for industrial 
reconfiguration, transformation and upgrading” (Guangzhou Daily, 27 March 2008; author’s 
translation).  
 New changes began to unfold rapidly thereafter. In May 2008, less than two 
months after Wang’s visit to Dongguan, the Guangdong government released a province-
wide economic restructuring plan known as “Decisions on pushing forth industrial and labor 
power relocation” (hereafter “Decisions”)9 . Central to the “Decisions” is the economic-
geographical strategy of ‘double relocation’ (shuang zhuanyi). As mentioned in section 1, 
these ‘double relocations’ refer to relocating targeted enterprises and the labor power they 
employ from the PRD to “relocation industrial parks” (chanye zhuanyi gongyeyuan) in the 
less developed regions of the province, namely the eastern and western ends and the 
northern highlands (ref. Figure 1). These targeted firms and labor were those generating 
‘two highs and one low’, i.e. high in pollution, high in energy use and low in efficiency (cf. 
section 1).  
Paralleling the relocation process was the strategy to enhance the industrial 
composition of the PRD through attracting advanced manufacturing and higher-order 
services. This would be done primarily – though not exclusively – through lobbying the 
central government to designate the intra-urban territories of Hengqin, Qianhai and 
Nansha as “nationally strategic” zones of policy experimentation with Macau and Hong 
Kong. Wang offered a detailed justification of his government’s restructuring rationale 
through the CPC’s mouthpiece, People’s Daily: 
To create an innovative Guangdong model, it is necessary to grasp key domains for 
autonomous innovation and pivotal sectors and work to overcome the technological barriers 
that constrain socioeconomic development in Guangdong. While there is a need to enhance 
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the innovative tendencies within traditional industries experiencing transformation and 
upgrading, there is also a need to accelerate the industrialization of innovative technologies; 
while there is a need to push though new up-and-coming industries, there is also a need to 
implement technological projects amongst privately-owned sectors, so as to ensure the 
fruits of innovation are more widely-shared. (Wang Yang, People’s Daily 17 October 2008; 
author’s translation) 
 
Labeling the industrial upgrading project ‘emptying the cage to change the birds’ (tenglong 
huanniao), Wang emphasized that his aim was to preclude economic ‘hollowing out’ by 
encouraging the growth of more high-tech firms:  
For the Pearl River Delta, the point is to develop higher-order technologies endogenously, 
within the productive mechanisms of traditional industries, in turn realizing the true meaning 
of ‘emptying the cage and changing the birds’ (tenglong huanniao), or it could be called 
‘expanding the cage and strengthening the birds’ (kuolong zhuangniao). On this basis, the 
situation of economic ‘hollowing out’ in the process of industrial transformation and 
upgrading could also be avoided. (Ibid.) 
 
Wang’s essay was an explicit attempt to justify the suddenness and ambitious extent of his 
developmental agenda after its implementation sparked widespread discussion and debate 
over its political and economic implications. In a Chinese political circle where key actors 
predominantly deploy codified language ‘internal to the institution’ (tizhinei) to convey their 
feelings, latent meanings are often expressed through symbolic metaphors. Viewed in 
historical perspective, Wang’s metaphorical choice of ‘cage’ and ‘birds’ appears deliberate. 
The original user of these metaphorical terms was Chen Yun, a senior economic advisor to 
Mao Zedong and, during the post-1978 reform era, an opponent of Deng Xiaoping’s 
(relatively) liberal approach to economic governance. Chen argued that the state could not 
hold ‘birds’ (i.e. capitalistic actors) tightly in its hands because they would suffocate; yet if 
the grip on the ‘birds’ loosened, they would inevitably fly away. The middle ground is to 
construct a sturdy ‘bird cage’ (i.e. an economy strongly regulated by the everlasting arms 
of the CPC) that contains some room for the ‘birds’ to fly and breathe. Widely-known in 
China as “birdcage economics” (niaolong jingji), Chen’s conceptualization exemplifies the 
internal logic of the CPC’s overall approach to socioeconomic regulation today: the 
allocation of more “decisive” roles to “the market”, the developmental goal proclaimed by 
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the Xi Jinping administration at the Third Plenum in November 2013, proceeds in tandem 
with the reinforcement of state economic involvement (cf. Lin, 2011; Lim, 2014a).  
Wang Yang’s extension of Chen Yun’s metaphor to popularize his province-level 
restructuring project exemplifies institutional path-dependency in at least two instances. 
First, it reaffirmed the Four Cardinal Principles instituted by the Deng regime in 1978.  
These principles are: 1) We must keep to the socialist road; 2) We must uphold the 
dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party; 
4) We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It is important to note 
that the third principle is the pivot on which the other three principles rest (for full text of 
Deng’s speech on the Four Cardinal Principles, see People’s Daily, 30 March 1979). And 
this principle means the CPC has to determine the territorial parameters for economic 
‘birds’ seeking to maneuver within its inter-scalar rule regime. The economic relations of 
the Guangdong regulatory regime across and beyond China were thus literally 
reconfigured through industrial policies like “double relocation” and the designation of 
“nationally strategic new areas”. Yet this proactive approach was still insufficient in itself to 
guarantee a smooth-sailing state rescaling process. Indeed, as section 4 will show, Wang’s 
restructuring project could materialize only because he had the support of the 
policymakers at the highest echelon, including the-then Chinese President, Hu Jintao10.  
Second, in seeking to retain the economic competitiveness of the PRD through 
significant industrial reconfiguration, Wang was signaling his intention to stay on the top 
rung of Deng’s ‘ladder step’ model. As mentioned earlier, this model presumes a ‘leveling 
out’ in living standards would occur automatically. Deng’s presumption underpinned 
industrial policies prior to the 2008 “Decisions”, and no targeted attempt had been 
launched to reconfigure the national industrial structure. Wang’s subsequent reflections 
suggest, however, that his fundamental intent in Guangdong was to ensure institutional 
continuity through change: 
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Practice has proven that with the conformity to market rules; with the courage to break 
through the path dependency that encumbers development; with the elimination of 
unreasonable interest groups; with the timely increase in developmental quality; and with 
putting the ability to sustain development in first place, it is definitely possible to create a 
developmental model that could deliver high value-added products, good quality 
development and personal income growth that is commensurate with the growth of the 
economy. (People’s Daily, 24 August 2012; author’s translation) 
 
Read in relation to his imploration to Dongguan cadres in March 2008, Wang’s use of 
‘market rules’ (shichang guilü) to justify breaking out of the labor-intensive, export-oriented 
“path dependency” (lujing yilai, the exact equivalent of the term Wang employed) only 
serves to reinforce the importance of state intervention in enhancing the stability of the 
national rule regime. As he emphasized during the Dongguan visit, the reconfiguration of 
spatial divisions of labor could – and should – involve proactive action on the part of local 
governments (cf. Guangzhou Daily, 27 March 2008). Furthermore, a clause in “Decisions” 
specified that the restructuring process required a fiscal injection of 50 billion yuan 
(~US$7.81 billion) over 5 years. Even with this financial support, there was no guarantee 
that PRD-based firms – of which a purported 50,000 firms shut down shortly after the crisis 
– would be willing to relocate to less developed regions within Guangdong province. This 
essentially means the Guangdong restructuring plan, discursively justified as following 
‘market rules’, was (and remains) an experimental project that entailed the state to 
underwrite the financial risks. Viewed in relation to state-directed uneven development in 
China since the Mao era, Wang’s approach underscores how the reconfiguration of 
regulatory relations (still) does not occur because of “market rules”. As the next section will 




4. The politics of instituting ‘double relocation’ in Guangdong 
 
Vis-à-vis the CPC’s politico-ideological commitment to spatial egalitarianism, Wang’s 
ambitious approach to shape up and ship out industrial actors within the PRD generated 
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two contradictions. At one level, the pursuit of new competitiveness in Guangdong 
contradicts Deng’s previously mentioned vision of attaining similar developmental 
standards across the country because it perpetuates the coastal bias in development. 
Central to this vision is the still-binding political commitment to even out income disparities 
over time. In approving new initiatives to enhance the locational advantage of the Pearl 
River Delta, however, the Chinese central government was effectively entrenching the 
geographically-uneven allocation of means of production across China. With reference to 
the previously-discussed notion of path-dependency, the central government was arguably 
‘locked in’ to its earlier choice to privilege Guangdong in its industrialization policies (ref. 
section 2). As a third of the national ‘floating population’ was employed by PRD-based 
industries, substantial deindustrialization was not politically plausible without first 
establishing alternative employment opportunities elsewhere in China. While attempts 
were launched simultaneously through the designation of new growth poles in inland China 
(primarily through the city-regions of Chengdu. Chongqing, Xi’an-Xianyang and Lanzhou), 
these attempts arguably represent longer-term solutions to the industrial ‘hollowing out’ 
that accompany economic restructuring. 
More pressing for national policymakers was the primary injunction to bring in 
‘upgraded’ industries while simultaneously relocating undesirable industries away from the 
PRD. It must be noted that this injunction in “Decisions” was in itself an experiment: 
‘emptying the cage’ was not only an intra-provincial issue, it would generate direct impacts 
on national employment. Its overarching objective, as Wang made clear through the 
People’s Daily in October 2008, was to preclude industrial ‘hollowing out’. While 
theoretically sound, it was unclear how the injunction could be put in practice: firms began 
to shut down, and replacements were hard to find in a period of immense economic 
uncertainty. Even if higher-order industries were willing to move into the PRD, emerging 
empirical evidence at the time indicated it would occur only after a time lag. For this 
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reason, as will be elaborated shortly, the Chinese central government became concerned 
with the reconfiguration process. In the midst of economic slowdown, how could the local 
governments across the province “strongly develop advanced manufacturing industries, 
high-order advanced technological industries, modern services and equivalent high value-
added industries” (“Decisions”, n.p.; author’s translation)? 
Within two months of the implementation of “Decisions”, there was widespread 
speculation that the local government in the manufacturing hub of Dongguan had begun 
‘driving away factories, driving away people’ (ganchang ganren). Local cadres purportedly 
went about ‘encouraging’ enterprises to relocate. The industrial ‘hollowing out’ was 
intensified by two developments, namely 1) the claim of one Dongguan cadre that 
discussions were underway to halve the city’s population [from 12 to 6 million]; and 2) the 
sudden appearance of extra-provincial officials to entice Dongguan-based firms to leave 
Guangdong altogether (Interview, planner A, Shenzhen, January 2013). The Dongguan 
government then came under pressure as worker protests grew (Ibid.). These 
developments impelled Jiang Ling, a CPC cadre and then Vice Mayor of Dongguan, to 
issue a full-page clarification of the city’s restructuring policies in a local newspaper in July 
2008 (see Figure 2). Ostensibly a bid to ensure social stability (and indirectly to assure 
senior leaders in Beijing that economic instability was not occurring at all), the rare 
occurrence of a CPC cadre publicly defending the state’s policies only accentuated the 
difficulty of attaining simultaneous industrial relocation and upgrading.  
Figure 2 here 
The Guangdong government’s ambitious reconfiguration of the preexisting spatial 
division of regulation not only worried local government officials, it raised the concern of 
national policymakers. Following the announcement of “Decisions”, the-then Premier Wen 
Jiabao made two separate trips to Guangdong in July and November 2008 in an official bid 
to ‘investigate and research’ (diaoyan) the economic situation in the province. For a senior 
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CPC leader to visit a domestic location for diaoyan twice in one year is rare; to do so twice 
in 5 months is of political significance. In his July 2008 visit, less than two months after the 
launch of <Decisions> in Guangdong, Wen opined on his preferred approach to managing 
the financial crisis:  
Guangdong’s socio-economy…is confronted with new challenges. The slowdown in the 
global economy and contraction in external demand has pronounced impacts on export-
oriented medium to small enterprises in the PRD. The proportion of non-state linked 
medium and small enterprises is more developed in Guangdong. Currently these 
enterprises are faced with more difficulties, hence support must be enhanced through credit, 
taxation and industrial policies. (China Securities Journal, 21 July 2008; author’s translation) 
 
During his second visit and, interestingly, in the company of Wang Yang, Wen Jiabao 
issued a public reminder that “the problems and difficulties facing medium and small 
enterprises have not been fundamentally resolved, their production and management 
situations remain grave. On this, there should be high-level focus and a continuation of 
initiatives to help these enterprises overcome their difficulties” (People’s Daily, 17 
November 2008). While appearing conservative and paternalistic, Wen’s proposed 
response was actually predicated on a major principle of governance in China. Contrary to 
popular conceptions that the CPC prizes GDP growth above all else, any government 
official in charge of economic development would first be evaluated on his/her ability to 
maintain social stability before GDP results are evaluated. It was the prospect of social 
unrest that motivated Wen, the country’s top-ranking official in charge of economic 
development, to adopt a position that placed social stability as the first regulatory priority. 
Assessed in retrospect, Wen Jiabao’s comments in November 2008 exemplify the 
inter-scalar tensions involved in reconfiguring the national structure of capital accumulation 
(cf. section 2). Wen was most likely issuing a targeted, albeit indirect, response to Wang’s 
elaborate view on the issue just a day before his arrival in Guangdong. Made during his 
visit to the city of Zhanjiang, Wang was defending the Guangdong government’s approach 
to manage medium and small enterprises within the policy framework of ‘double 
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relocation’: 
Some people say this year alone [2008] 50,000 firms shut down, whether this figure is true 
is one matter, everyone should seriously analyze this: amongst those firms that have shut 
down, how many of them are large-scale firms? None! In my prediction, these [fallen] firms 
were mostly lagging productive forces. The cyclical extirpation of lagging productive forces 
is an effect of market economic forces. (Guangzhou Daily, 14 November 2008; author’s 
translation) 
 
Exemplifying a distinctive pattern developed during his tenure in Guangdong, Wang (once 
again) peppered his explanation in Zhanjiang in relation to “market economic forces”, on 
the premise that the market contained objective rules for governments to follow: 
30 years ago, we chose the market economy and consequently enjoyed the joy of fast-
paced growth. Today we must also courageously confront the pain brought about by cyclical 
turbulences in the market. Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Guangdong has adopted 
a particular way to run at high-speed, to slow down a little now, to adjust the style and raise 
the technical capacities suitable for long distance running, this is very normal…the state 
should never do what the market will not allow, it should never save lagging productive 
forces. (Ibid.) 
 
Wang’s comments were contradictory in two ways, however. First, he reinforced the fact 
that marketization in post-Mao China was never about the ‘free market’ or its supposed 
corollary, perfect competition. By his own admission, the enterprises hurt most by the 
‘double relocation’ policy were medium and small enterprises; “none” of the large-scale 
firms were hurt or, presumably, were allowed to be hurt. Viewed in itself, the survival of 
large-scale enterprises (of which it was unclear how many were state-owned) is not 
surprising, as their production processes were (and remain) largely organized through 
relatively flexible sub-contractual arrangements with smaller (and largely privately-owned) 
enterprises. Of greater significance is the Guangdong government’s willingness to accept 
the subservient and vulnerable position of medium and small enterprises – the economic 
actors that were supposed to be the centerpieces of a ‘free market’. This complicates the 
popular portrayal of Wang as a market-oriented reformer and illustrates the decidedly 
protectionist undercurrent of the restructuring strategies (cf. Mulvad, 2015). In fact, the 
intention was not only to ensure the big businesses (in particular those of the SOEs) were 
shielded from the crisis: it was to provide these businesses with new opportunities for 
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capital accumulation in other parts of the province (or, failing which, in other parts of the 
country). 
Second, the sequence of development presented in Wang’s comment in Zhanjiang 
foregrounds how it was the CPC that chose market-oriented governance, not the other way 
round. The overarching “national strategy”, this paper argues, was to enable the CPC to 
remain in perpetual power (ref. the Four Cardinal Principles). At the policy level, this 
means having to experiment with new ways of engaging market regulatory logics without 
compromising the stability of the party-state structure. After the 2008 global financial crisis, 
the Chinese party-state apparatus again found itself having to choose how to strategically 
reposition economic geographies across the country. Operating within a context of 
intensifying global interconnections, however, meant the remaking of state-market relations 
through state rescaling could not be based on a fixed playbook – the process was 
proactive, opportunistic and experimental at the same time.  
And the inherent risks involved in this multi-dimensional regulatory approach 
explain why the “nationally strategic” designation of reform frontiers invites “strategic 
disobedience” (ref. Wedemen, 2001; section 2). Indeed, the Guangdong government’s 
decision to “never save lagging productive forces” and persist in reconfiguring the 
provincial industrial structure was just as risk-laden as Wen Jiabao’s imploration to keep 
afloat medium and small enterprises through new interventions. Senior policymakers thus 
had to take a chance on whether the tentative approach in Guangdong would reproduce – 
if not enhance – national economic growth. Just days following Wen’s November 2008 
visit, Wang offered an oblique counterpoint that reiterated his decision to take this risk:  
Amongst these debates, some are for, some against. I thought about it, over the three 
decades of ‘opening up’, Guangdong has embarked on its own path, so let others do the 
debating. Right now it is still the same, we are taking our own path, a path of scientific 
development, so let others do the debating. Regardless of what others say, the ‘double 
shifts’ must be emphasized, ‘emptying the cage and changing the birds’ must be 
emphasized. We must never launch just about anything in order to guarantee GDP growth. 
(Nanfang Dushibao, 21 Nov 2008; author’s translation) 
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Wang’s insistence was the final straw for some senior members of the Politburo. On 
Christmas day of 2008, the People’s Daily published a critical commentary – rarely leveled 
against senior CPC cadres – to express their views on Wang’s restructuring plan: 
Just a while ago, medium and small enterprises encountered external and internal 
difficulties and were effectively immobilized. This especially applied to labor-intensive 
medium and small enterprises labeled as ‘two highs, one low’ [high pollution, high energy 
usage and low efficiency], they were viewed as impediments to industrial upgrading. Some 
places have appeared too hasty in the process of ‘emptying the cage and changing the 
birds’, this caused a significantly squeeze in the survival space for medium and small 
enterprises. In the face of the strong force brought about by the global financial crisis, the 
situation of these enterprises has only exacerbated. (People’s Daily, 25 December 2008; 
author’s translation) 
 
While not mentioning Wang by name, the intended audience of the message was explicitly 
stated through the references to Wang’s ‘emptying the cage to change the birds’ metaphor 
and the industrial classification term of ‘two highs, one low’ (lianggao yidi): 
Even if there are indeed medium and small enterprises that embody the ‘two highs, one 
low’, there should not be a simplistic and brutal squeeze of their survival space. Be it in the 
enhancement of industrial upgrading or in the relocation of these enterprises, policy and 
financial support must be given. (Ibid.) 
 
Following this public opprobrium, Wang’s tone softened. “Emptying the cage and changing 
the birds does not mean emptying out all the birds”, Wang explained, “even a fool will not 
do this” (WenWeiPo, 12 February 2009; author’s translation). By implication, the 
Guangdong restructuring approach was never a ‘foolish’ one-size-fits-all strategy. Wang 
further reiterated the stance taken earlier by the Dongguan government: 
Even to labor intensive industries and lower-order manufacturing sectors, the ‘empty the 
cage and change the birds’ method cannot be based on compulsion. Right now no 
enterprise is forcibly made to move, no enterprise is having its water or electricity supplies 
cut, our method is to attract through benefits, we tell enterprises the places where operating 
costs are low, the places where workers are aplenty, in practice we respect the will of the 
enterprises, the government uses appropriate policies and hope people make these kinds of 
choices [i.e. relocate]. (Ibid.) 
 
Yet field research indicates that the Guangdong government’s “hope” was officially 
transposed into a performance target: local officials’ ability to successfully implement the 
‘double relocation’ policy could affect their promotional prospects (Interview, Planner C, 
Shenzhen, January 2013). Interestingly, the formal inclusion of this performance target 
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indicates not all officials were supportive of the ‘double relocation’ policy. After all, as 
Planner C explains, local village collectives have been highly dependent on rental 
collection from migrant workers in cities like Dongguan, Jiangmen and Foshan, key 
manufacturing hubs in the PRD. To push for manufacturing firms and migrant workers to 
relocate could mean a loss in short-term income if not a local economic contraction, a 
situation from which Dongguan has yet to fully recover (Ibid.). In other words, a 
developmental path had been established in industrial hubs like Dongguan, Jiangmen and 
Foshan that benefited specific interest groups such as village collectives, and naturally 
these groups resisted change that would compromise their economic interests. Changing 
paths meant local officials had to turn senior policymakers’ “hope” into reality. 
At this point, it would be helpful to assess the active involvement of local cadres 
within the intertwined process of state rescaling, institutional path-dependency and 
‘strategic disobedience’ in China (ref. section 2). While the entire Guangdong economy 
was in a state of uncertainty during and after 2008, the Wang administration already 
contemplated economic restructuring independent of the crisis. “Strategic disobedience” 
was thus in the pipeline; the new ambiguities generated by the financial crisis only 
catalyzed its actualization. As then-Vice Governor, Zhu Xiaodan, acknowledged, “even 
without the global financial crisis, it was already time for industrial transformation and 
upgrading in Guangdong” (Nanfang Dushibao, 8 March 2012). Wang Yang put this point 
into sharper perspective: 
Regarding extra-local relocation, if it occurred during the good times enterprises would be 
unwilling to move, yet if it occurred during economic contraction some enterprises claim to 
have no ability to move, then no movement will ever occur. Practically the financial crisis 
has lowered the costs of relocation, adding to this the government is providing a series of 
preferential policies to facilitate industrial transformation and upgrading, this moment is an 
excellent opportunity for [industrial] relocation. (Xinxi Shibao, 18 July 2009; author’s 
translation) 
 
Placed in relation to the post-2007 reconfiguration of regulatory relations in Guangdong, 
however, Wang’s initiative was more accurately a form of strategic alignment with central 
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goals. The Guangdong government’s apparent “disobedience” was not a lack of 
“compliance” to an a priori directive from the central government. While the strongly-
worded response in People’s Daily may be read as a mandate from Beijing to the 
Guangdong government, the issuance of this directive was actually a response to a 
bottom-up developmental approach. The cause-effect relation in this process is the direct 
opposite of Wedeman’s (2001) assumption that “strategic disobedience” occurs as a 
reaction to an a priori directive by the central government. 
In addition, there were strong signs the central government had different views on 
the restructuring process in Guangdong. Under conditions of ambiguity, as the-then 
Premier, Wen Jiabao, demonstrated in his response to the global financial crisis, the 
Chinese central government would most likely be cautious in its response. This 
corresponds to Wedeman’s proposition. However, Hu Jintao’s subsequent endorsement of 
the Guangdong project indicates not all policymakers within the central government 
believed in a cautious response to ambiguities. As it soon became clear, Wang’s overt 
unwillingness to follow Wen’s advice led to speculations over differences in the central 
government’s view of Guangdong’s ‘double relocation’ approach. When Hu visited 
Guangdong in March 2009, Wang said in his presence that “last year [2008], during which 
our province was confronted by the global financial crisis and was faced with its most 
difficult moment since the turn of the century, the General Secretary [i.e. Hu] entrusted 
comrade [Li] Changchun to conduct an investigation of Guangdong and, based on his 
report, clearly issued opinions that guide our work in Guangdong.” (Yangcheng Wanbao, 7 
March 2009). There was no mention of Wen’s two trips to Guangdong in 2008; Wen’s 
previously mentioned instructions to save medium and small enterprises affected by the 
global demand slump were also unreferenced. This omission is significant in three ways. 
First, it implies Wen Jiabao did not visit Guangdong with Hu Jintao’s instructions. 
Only Li Changchun, another senior cadre in the Politburo, was “entrusted” by the Hu 
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government to visit Guangdong. Second, Wang was indirectly saying Wen’s comments 
had no impact on his or Hu’s view on industrial policies launched by the Guangdong 
government. Again, only Li Changchun’s report had any impact. And this leads to the third 
point: the central government’s eventual guidance for Guangdong did not include Wen’s 
advice. That Wang could take this daring discursive step strongly suggests he had the full 
support of the Chinese president in the senior echelons of the CPC. This consequently 
suggests the central government was unsure of its strategic response to the global 
financial crisis. To be sure, where differences in opinions existed within the central state 
apparatus, the proposed restructuring project in Guangdong was not paralyzed. If 
anything, as Hu put it in his second visit to Guangdong in 2009, it propelled the project in a 
forward motion: 
In confronting the global financial crisis, the Guangdong government emphasized seizing 
the favorable circumstance induced by the crisis to reconfigure and enhance the industrial 
structure and transform the mode of economic development…I think your reasoning is very 
good, you have to persevere, always move ahead, and truly give a good fight in this tough 
battle of transforming the economic development approach. To gain awareness early, to act 
early, is good proactivity. (Guangzhou Daily, 30 December 2009). 
 
Hu’s eventual acceptance of the restructuring approach indicates how “disobedience” from 
lower hierarchical levels is symptomatic of differences within the top echelon of the CPC. 
Whether its unrelenting stance vis-à-vis calls to help medium and small enterprises would 
morph into a form of “disobedience” – and hence become subject to what the CPC calls 
‘party discipline’ – was contingent on its ability to capitalize on planning uncertainties within 
the central government. More accurately, then, the “strategic” aspect of the Guangdong 
government’s apparent non-compliance lies in how it aligns to and then redefines the 
‘national interest’. This phenomenon corresponds with Peck’s (2002: 340) observation that 
“the present scalar location of a given regulatory process is neither natural nor inevitable, 
but instead reflects an outcome of past political conflicts and compromises”. In this regard, 
“strategic disobedience” in Guangdong was not a negative outcome, at least not in the 
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short term. What emerged was a delicate operating consensus between different 
regulatory levels that created new spaces for capital investments and crisis deferral.   
 
5. Conclusion 
That economic development in Guangdong had been driven by labor-intensive and highly-
pollutive industries – particularly since the intensification of urban-oriented reforms in the 
mid-1990s – is well-documented. That this trajectory could not last was also expected. 
Quite how the province was to undertake structural reforms without undermining its 
economic importance at the national scale was unknown until the ‘double relocation’ 
industrial policy became clear by 2009. The institution of this policy was a politicized 
process. Viewed in tandem with the Wang administration’s high-profile push to ‘scale up’ 
Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha into “nationally strategic” reform frontiers (ref. Figure 1; cf. 
Lim, 2014a), the ‘double relocation’ strategy may not appear to be directly of the ‘national 
interest’. On closer inspection, however, this industrial policy was a means to enable the 
institution of new reforms and policy experimentation in Guangdong. In other words, the 
emergence of new regulatory logics in Guangdong entailed a shift in its underlying 
industrial structure, a prerequisite that would not be met without the proactive intervention 
of Guangdong policymakers. This paper is a critical evaluation of this intervention. 
Two conceptual implications can be drawn from the state rescaling process in/of 
Guangdong. On the one hand, Hu’s decision reflects the growing importance of bottom-up 
governance: the Guangdong government successfully pushed through its restructuring 
agenda and ‘won’. Perhaps more significantly, the crisis offered an opportune moment for 
the Guangdong policymakers to create new “nationally strategic” opportunities as part of 
the restructuring project: while the large-scale shutdown of medium and small enterprises 
may constitute an excruciating short-term blow to employment and income, the 
Guangdong policymakers simultaneously sought to ease the economic pain by imploring 
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the central government to designate the territories of Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha as 
“nationally strategic” reform frontiers (ref. locations in Figure 1). This active engagement 
with the central government complicates simple models that view centralization and 
decentralization as a binary. It calls, instead, for a systematic evaluation of industrial 
restructuring in the PRD – multiple policies in different locations were instituted 
simultaneously between 2008 and 2012, each engaging with different inherited institutions, 
each generating new relations with the central government and transnational capital. 
On the other hand, the persistence of a fragmented national economy is not 
engendering a resurgence of autonomous ‘feudal economies’ (zhuhou jingji). Rather, it 
demonstrates how the system of reciprocal accountability, to re-borrow Shirk’s (1993) 
terms, has generated immense political and economic incentives for the alignment of local 
developmental agendas to the centrally-determined “national strategy” (ref. section 2). This 
in turn calls for the relationship between Wang Yang and senior policymakers like Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao to be evaluated at the macro-structural level. Despite their 
differences, all three were embedded within the system of reciprocal accountability and 
were expected to behave strategically within the logics of this system. For the Wang 
administration, the strategic objective was to ensure the PRD city-region (and Guangdong 
more broadly) remain attractive to capital. Its practical goal was to assure both the central 
government and corporate investors that the province remains an attractive site of/for 
capital accumulation.  
With the provincial economy increasingly impacted by the 2008 global financial 
crisis (and which, at the time, showed no signs of abating), Wang made a drastic 
announcement to categorize redundant economic actors as “lagging productive forces”. 
The outcome was a form of managed deindustrialization. According to official figures 
revealed by the Zhu Xiaodan, the Governor of Guangdong, more than 7000 firms were 
relocated (though it was not known whether they relocated within the province or moved to 
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other regions within China) between 2008 and 2012, while a staggering total of almost 
80000 firms either stopped operations or shut down during the same period (WenWeiPo, 
26 January 2013). Against these signs of economic contraction, the Guangdong 
government enabled GDP and employment growth in Guangdong to remain positive 
throughout the post-crisis period (i.e. 2009 to the present). This achievement has to be 
assessed in relation to the previously mentioned “nationally strategic new areas” in the 
PRD and industry-specific upgrading in the PRD (cf. Chen and Ku, 2014). 
Place within a broader geographical-historical context, the ‘double relocation’ policy 
in Guangdong indicates state rescaling in China is not an end-state that can be attained or 
secured. It is not a mechanical, one-way devolution of regulatory capacities from the 
national scale to the supra- or sub-national governments. To demonstrate this, this paper 
moved beyond an uncritical mapping of state rescaling to explain how the reconfiguration 
of regulatory scales functions as an ongoing process of contestation, negotiation and co-
management of state space. In so doing, it foregrounded the contradictions associated 
with national-scale regulatory directives, some launched back in the 1950s (cf. Peck and 
Zhang, 2013; Zhang and Peck, 2015). Specifically, the post-crisis restructuring agenda in 
Guangdong reaffirmed the difficulty – if not impossibility – of attaining Mao and Deng’s joint 
vision of national spatial egalitarianism. The central government’s willingness to approve 
this agenda (which has since been emulated by other coastal city-regions in Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu) further undermines attempts by the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao administrations to 
institute more ‘coordinated’ regional development (quyu xietiao fazhan). These 
contradictions collectively underscore the difficulty of actualizing Pareto-optimality in inter-
regional resource transfers within the context of intensifying global economic integration. 
Indeed, insofar as place-specific competitiveness in the global economy remains a core 
policy concern for the CPC, it appears that new rounds of policy experimentation and 
reforms in China will continue to be shaped by the tensions between rescaling initiatives, 
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each with its own set of ‘strategic disobedience’, and the tendency, if not temptation, to 




                                                        
1 The socioeconomic statistics – including GDP – of Hong Kong and Macau are calculated 
separately from mainland China.  
2  It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the emergence of these territories known 
officially as “nationally strategic new areas”. In summary, Wang pushed for the designation of these 
territories as delimited zones of policy experimentation. The policies are to be of significance to both 
the Chinese central government and the economies of Macau and Hong Kong SARs. A key point to 
be made in this paper is the constitutive role of the ‘double relocation’ policy in the designation of 
these three territories. For an overview of the broader significance of spatially-targeted 
experimentation in these ‘new areas’, see Lim (2014). 
3 Officially, given the lack of inter-provincial coordination, it has to be stated that relocation policies 
remain within the province so that the government appears to prioritize the provincial interests. This 
is an extension of the protectionist, inward-looking tendencies of the Mao era. In reality, however, 
given the huge difference in infrastructural facilities between the PRD and the rest of Guangdong 
province, the Guangdong government in fact did not mind if undesirable industries leave the 
province altogether rather than attempt to upgrade these industries within the province (Interview, 
academic and regular consultant to the government, January 2013).  
4 The empirical materials presented in this paper draws from fieldwork conducted between February 
2012 and January 2013 on a broader, multi-sited project on policy experimentation and the shifting 
logics of socioeconomic regulation across China. Discursive materials from key political actors were 
sourced and translated by the author; supporting materials were drawn from direct interviews with 
CPC cadres, planners and scholars in several cities in the Pearl River Delta. Often on the advice of 
these interviewees, further follow up work was done to derive supporting evidence. The field 
research was supplemented by archival work conducted in Beijing, Shenzhen and Chongqing. The 
materials were then triangulated to align to the analytical approach, which is similar to what Zhang 
(2012: 2855) terms “a social constructivist approach” that “brings to the foreground the constitutive 
socio-spatial context or unique historical-geographical conjuncture of policy-making activities”. 
Adopting this approach entails juxtaposing a range of information to present a multi-perspectival 
narrative on the connections between state rescaling and institutional path-dependency. 
5 This, incidentally, is the rationale for the ‘shock therapy’ approach to reforms in the former Soviet 
bloc, i.e. to incapacitate defenders of the old regime. Geographically-targeted policy 
experimentation is an alternative approach to “managed” transformation in which everything 
changes at once.  
6 Ratios for both Guangdong and China determined by author’s calculation. 
7 The official term of this transformation project in Mandarin is <珠江三角洲地區改革發展規劃綱要
2008－2020年>. The cited content is printed on page 7 of the original document; translated by 
author. 
8 This term that would subsequently be widely used to characterize Guangdong’s province-wide 
restructuring approach. 
9 The official term of this policy in Mandarin is <關於推進產業轉移和勞動力轉移的決定>. 
10 Hu‘s support was important at both the personal level and in terms of national economic-
geographical reconfiguration. In 2007, when Wang was Party Secretary of Chongqing, Hu approved 
a series of nationally-strategic socioeconomic policies aimed at bridging the urban-rural divide 
caused by the Mao-era household-registration (or hukou) institution of population control. That Hu 
would approve these major reforms during Wang Yang’s term was a glowing recognition of the 
latter’s efforts at initiating institutional reforms. Ironically, it was precisely the institution Wang tried to 
reform in Chongqing – the hukou system – that enabled the Guangdong government to effect labor 
force relocation at will (ref. Lim, 2014b; Mulvad, 2015). 
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